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As a theoretician of history interested in
the comparative theory of the human sci-
ences, I am trying to reflect on certain
changes, turns and approaches that are
observable in contemporary human and
social sciences. I see the growing inter-
est in nonhuman beings (flourishing ani-
mal studies, plant studies and thing stud-
ies) within the context of an emerging par-
adigm of non-anthropocentric human sci-
ences, and I would like to consider certain
problems and questions that I see as fun-
damental for the kind of future-oriented
knowledge about the past that these new
tendencies portend.
What I mean by anthropocentrism here is
the attitude that presents the human spe-
cies as the centre of the world, enjoying
hegemony over other beings and func-
tioning as masters of a nature which ex-
ists to serve its needs. This attitude leads
to speciesism (assigning different values or 
rights to beings on the basis of their spe-
cies membership) and is related to the kind
of discrimination that is practiced by man
against other species. Optimally, a non-an-
thropocentric paradigm seeks to de-centre
human beings and focus on nonhumans as
subjects of research (often quite apart from
their relationships with humans).
I would define “non-anthropocentric hu-
manities”1 or posthumanities as an institu-
tionalised set of research topics, techniques
and interests that derives its ethos from the
intellectual movement and ethical stance
called posthumanism. This ethical stance
may be understood as a variety of approach-
es that carry on the legacy of the humanities
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after humanism in pursuing non- or anti-anthropocentric lines of inquiry. The problem of posthu-
manism is very complex because there are no singular, homogenic trends, styles of thinking or 
philosophical directions that can be related to this term.2 The spectrum of this perspective goes 
from discussions of the ethical treatment of animals, through the boundaries of species identity, 
transgenics and cross-species hybrids to biometrics. There is no doubt, however, that a common 
basis of all these trends and tendencies is the problematisation, critique and/or rejection of anthro-
pocentrism.3 Key research problems addressed by the posthumanities include the boundaries of
species identity, the relations between the human and the nonhuman (human beings’ affiliations 
with technology, the environment, animals, things), and questions of biopower, biopolitics and bi-
otechnology. As stressed by Cary Wolfe, the editor of a series of books entitled “Posthumanities”,4
there is no intention to somehow reject humanism as such and the values related to it. The inten-
tion is rather to consider how those values (justice, tolerance, equality, dignity, human rights, etc.) 
became a part of the definition of uniqueness and exceptionality of the human kind. The aim is to 
unbury the genealogy of what today is called posthumanities. These analyses are supposed to an-
ticipate the shape of the “humanities” in the future, i.e. when the humanities become the posthu-
manities.5
The inadequacy of current theories for contemporary global problems
Knowledge is relative and every theory is created in a particular time and place as a result of 
particular needs, and thus should be constantly verified. In the context of the emerging post-
humanities, it is crucial that we study approaches related to postmodernism from a historical 
perspective, treating their heroes (Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Geertz, Said and White in the the-
ory of history) not as avant-garde authorities for future research but as classics of the genre.
Those thinkers and their methodologies must be historicised and contextualised.6 This is not to 
say that they are not important for today’s research; this is not to say that they are not relevant. 
But I think that at present the theory of the human and social sciences is a step behind what is 
going on in the contemporary world in terms of environmental cataclysms, the crisis of climate 
change and, in terms of technology, genetic engineering and nanotechnology (plus the spread
of global capitalism), and thus must bring under consideration the new situations and phenom-
ena that technology has created. Theory has to “catch up” with the main problems addressed by 
current research since existing theories and interpretive tools are inadequate to account for the 
rapidly changing world.7
This inadequacy of current theories for problems that surround us has been observed in histori-
cal studies for several years now;8 however, recently it was highlighted by a well-known schol-
ar in the field of postcolonial studies and a representative of the so-called Subaltern school of 
historiography – Dipesh Chakrabarty. His recent article “The Climate of History: Four Theses” 
(2009) marked also a spectacular and revealing shift of his scholarly interests. Chakrabarty de-
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fines himself as “a practicing historian with a strong interest in the nature of his tory as a form of 
knowledge”.9 In this article, he reflects on the collapse of the old humanist distinction between 
natural history and human history. Chakrabarty claims that we might trace its beginning to the 
Industrial Revolution, but only recently, in the second half of the twentieth century, did we be-
come “geological agents”, meaning humans became a force of nature, having a tremendous 
impact on the planet on a geological scale. He proposes that historians should speak more 
about species (and their mass extinction), about the problem of our collective self-recognition
and “should think of humans as a form of life and look on human history as part of the history of 
life . . . on this planet”.10 Certainly Chakrabarty is well aware of the dangers of the kinds of univer-
sals that postcolonial studies were fighting against, but nevertheless he is not afraid to call for a 
“negative universal history” that arises from a shared sense of a catastrophe (climate change).11
For my argument presented here, of special importance is the fact that he is explicit about the 
inadequacies of present approaches and theories in dealing with various ecological crises. Thus, 
Chakrabarty confesses: “As the crisis [the current planetary crisis of climate change – ED] gath-
ered momentum in the last few years, I realised that all my readings in theories of globalisation, 
Marxist analysis of capital, subaltern studies, and postcolonial criticism over the last twenty-five 
years, while enormously useful in studying globalisation, had not really prepared me for making 
sense of this planetary conjuncture within which humanity finds itself today.”12
This honest statement is just a sign that theoretically oriented scholars are becoming more and 
more aware that, after the postmodernist turn to fragmented reality, micronarrative (microhis-
tory) and local histories, there is a need to reconsider “big picture questions”.
A justification for a nonanthropocentric approach
Where can we find a justification for a nonanthropocentric approach? What is the validity of such 
knowledge? In other words: what do we need for this nonanthropocentric paradigm?
Let me begin with a statement that I often heard from Hayden White while participating in his
seminars and lectures: “To be a historian is not a choice of career. It is an existential choice.” Fol-
lowing this important remark, I would say that to speak about going beyond anthropocentrism
or about posthumanism is not to pick up a fancy theme; it is not to consider an epistemological
approach, but it is mainly a future-oriented ethical choice. Observing the results of ecological
crisis and rapid technological progress and especially recent achievements in genetic engineer-
ing, biotechnology, neuropharmacology and nanotechnology, I am convinced that as historians 
and intellectuals we should again think about “big picture questions”, about global questions.
In the 1970s, a Polish scholar, Henryk Skolimowski, introduced the concept of eco-philosophy, 
which questioned the survival value of the kind of scientific knowledge which took physics with 
its restrictive rationality and objectivity as its paradigm. “Our knowledge,” he wrote in 1974, “and 
we should never forget this – is a supreme instrument in aiding the species in the process of 
survival”.13 But, knowledge has to evolve and change together with the evolution of species and 
according to the cognitive needs of the human species. Skolimowski pointed out that, in the in-
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terest of preserving the human species, we do not need abstract knowledge but a knowledge 
that contributes to its survival. 
Despite an Enlightened trust in knowledge as a “supreme instrument,” I find this argument quite 
convincing. Indeed, if we consider the host of publications on the Holocaust, we cannot avoid be-
ing struck by the way that the knowledge we have produced has failed to prevent the crimes
against humanity during the war in former Yugoslavia or the genocide in Rwanda. So, if we ask 
the question: what kind of humanities do we need today? I might answer that we need the kind 
of knowledge, cognition and human science that have survival value and might help in the pro-
tection and continuation of the species.
It seems that in contemporary intellectual practice scholars are not connected by methods or 
theories but by the problems on which they focus their intellectual efforts, primarily because
those problems are directly or indirectly related to controlling the life and death (biopolitics, nec-
ropolitics) of humans, on the one hand, and protecting “life” on earth, on the other. Protecting life 
is a “paternalistic” project and we have to be very aware of its results. Some scholars would call 
it “enlightened anthropocentrism” insomuch as it takes under consideration nature and nonhu-
mans and presupposes that our ethical care for nature and nonhumans comes from our care of 
and responsibility to humans. This idea would be rejected by scholars working in the paradigm 
of “deep ecology” or the Gaia theory, who claim that nature or the earth will take care of itself.14
Also, we should not forget that life (and the survival of species) is not necessarily the highest
value for everybody.15 Obviously, during the process of evolution, some specia become extinct 
and new ones appear and we should not desperately seek to preserve them. So, the survival
paradigm is not by any means an unquestionable absolute.
Historians themselves also express their awareness of this problem while asking: “How often
do we consider the unwelcome but ineluctable ecological fact that, while life on earth could sur-
vive just fine without humans (indeed it would no doubt flourish in our absence), without ants
the entire foundation would crumble?”16
Keeping in mind the limitations of the survival paradigm, let us make the following assumption: 
the challenge for today’s research is not so much in asking new questions and proposing new 
theories or methods of analysis, which would spring from current research trends in humanities, 
but to place the research itself in the context of the emerging paradigm of nonanthropocentric 
knowledge, or posthumanities. Andrew Pickering called this strategy a “posthumanist displace-
ment of our interpretative frameworks”.17 Of course, the point is not to eliminate the human be-
ing from our studies (of the past) but – as I mentioned above – to displace the human subject 
from the centre of historical, archaeological and anthropological studies.
I would suggest that in the face of an ecological crisis and radical transformation of what it 
means to be human caused by genetic engineering and psychopharmacology, we need the kind 
of knowledge, cognition and human science that has survival value and will help in the protec-
tion and continuation of the species. Thus, a big question for “future friendly” historical stud-
ies would be: what kind of research questions, research materials, theories and approaches
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should we – as historians and intellectuals – promote in order to strengthen the survival value 
of knowledge produced by reflection on the past? Are these questions about justice, ethics, de-
mocracy, freedom, human rights, dignity, God or the sacred? Which of the cognitive categories
used by us should be turned into normative categories? What categories should be established
as normative?
Towards collectives of humans and nonhumans
I attempt to move beyond debates about historical narration, historical representation, and, gen-
erally speaking, relations between text and past reality, debates which predominated in histori-
cal theory from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. I propose that it is time to challenge and tran-
scend the specific approach to the past called history understood as “the science of people in 
time” (Marc Bloch) and its not only eurocentric and phallocentric but, above all, anthropocentric
character. Our reflection about the past should extend to those nonhuman beings that have re-
cently been studied across various disciplines. Today, with the development of insurrectional and 
militant historiography, things, plants and nonhuman animals should also be incorporated into 
history as something other than passive recipients of human actions.
The future of thinking about the past will depend on whether and how scholars manage to mod-
ify their understanding of nonhuman agents: nonhuman animals, plants and things. Questions
concerning the status of nonhuman agents in the past, relations between the human and the 
non-human, the organic and the inorganic, between people and things and between things them-
selves are of fundamental importance for reconceptualising the study of the past. Therefore, an 
important challenge is to rethink the nonhuman aspect of the past in a context other than sem-
iotics, discourse theory or representation theory, with a special focus on the materiality, con-
creteness, relations and interactions and so-called presence of the past.18
What we need is to establish a human–nonhuman relationship based on a nonanthropocen-
tric approach and on a relational epistemology. As anthropologist Nurit Bird-David has shown, 
thinking based on relational epistemology is marked by an absence of the ontological dualism
of nature and culture, and body and mind, that are characteristic of western thought; self and 
personhood are relational to, and not separated from, the world. The world in this approach is a 
heterarchical one, rather than hierarchical. “I relate, therefore I am,” writes Bird-David, describing 
the intimate engagements of the natives with their environment. Moreover, she does not reify
the notion of “relationship” into an entity but prefers to talk about “‘relatedness’ meaning two be-
ings/things mutually responsive to one other”.19
Scholars influenced by Bruno Latour are interested in how humans and nonhumans interact
through various processes of mediation and actually form collectives; how through various
crossovers they exchange their properties. The term “relational epistemology” is also used by
Latour, especially in his actor-network theory.20 Referring to a collective of humans and non-
humans, this epistemology – as it is in Bird-David’s approach – rejects the positivist view of ob-
jects or actors as closed and separated from the world, existing in themselves prior to any par-
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ticipation in ecosocial and semiotic networks of interactions (including the interactions in which 
they are observed, named, etc.).
The need for such an approach in historical studies has been observed also by historians them-
selves, especially those who are interested in environmental history. For example, Ted Steinberg
is well aware that “we need a less anthropocentric and less arrogant view” of the concept of hu-
man agency, while Richard D. Foltz, in a Latourian mode, claims that history is about interactions 
and interconnections and we should not limit them to connections between humans since “many 
of our most significant historical interactions have been and continue to be with non-humans”. 
Calling for the integration of environmental history with world history, he claims that “world his-
tory, if done properly – that is expanding the theme of interactions to include all actors, not just 
human ones – is not only good scholarship; it may be vital to saving the planet!”21
Latour’s project of critical sociology, that is a point of reference for many scholars interested 
in transcending anthropocentrism, is primarily the study of the collective of humans and non-
humans, especially the evolution of their relations as well as the emergence and transforma-
tion of new associations. His actor-network theory is not a critique of metanarratives, nor is it 
concerned with dissemination or deconstruction. Rather, it is an attempt to go beyond postmod-
ern ways of thinking. For example, the French scholar claims that “objectivity does not refer to a 
special quality of the mind, an inner state of justice and fairness, but to the presence of objects
which have been rendered able . . . to object to what is told about them.”22 Conceived in this way, 
objectivity is synonymous with the creation of the conditions for resistance or protest on the part 
of objects. Latour continues: 
If social scientists wanted to become objective, they would have to find the very rare, cost-
ly, local, miraculous, situation where they can render their subject of study as much as 
possible able to object to what is said about them, to be as disobedient as possible to the 
protocol, and to be as capable to raise their own questions in their own terms and not in 
those of the scientists whose interests they do not have to share!23
The quest for the resisting object – an object resistant to dominant theories – could be the goal 
of the project of nonanthropocentric reflection about the past. This idea fits with Andrew Picker-
ing’s call for the quest for – what he calls – “strange objects”: “The work in question in science 
studies seeks above all to display empirically the existence of some strange objects in the world:
assemblages of people and things, the human and the nonhuman, in which the evolution of the 
former helps to structure that of the latter and vice versa.”24
According to Pickering, these strange objects, assemblages, challenge classical social sciences 
since they are “impure”; they transgress traditional disciplinary borders and, if seriously consid-
ered, could change the definition of various human and social disciplines.
I took this challenge seriously, and following Latour’s and Pickering’s remarks, several years 
ago, I began my own search for disobedient, strange and impure objects. In 2003 in California, I 
conducted interviews with several directors of local funeral homes. I was interested in how new 
technology is used to preserve human remains. I was particularly fascinated by the so-called 
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LifeGem – the synthetic diamond made from human ashes.25 For me, it was an interesting case 
of going beyond the relationship of the organic and nonorganic. More or less at the same time, 
I heard about the transgenic, fluorescent rabbit produced by Eduardo Kac, an artwork known as 
the “GFP Bunny”. This transgenic animal does not exist in nature. It is a product of genetic engi-
neering and, as Kac says, Alba was created in order to “examine the notions of normalcy, het-
erogeneity, purity, hybridity, and otherness; to consider a nonsemiotic notion of communication 
as the sharing of genetic material across traditional species barriers”.26 In 2002, two artists from
the Royal College of Art, Georg Tremmel and Shiho Fukuhara, presented a project called Biopre-
sence.27 The goal of Biopresence was to introduce human DNA into a tree, without changing the 
genes of the resulting plant, in order to create “living memorials” or “transgenic tombstones”. A 
couple of years ago, there was the story of Oscar Pistorius (known as “Blade Runner”), who has 
prosthetic legs and breaks records in running races but was not admitted to the Olympic Games 
because of his “superhuman” abilities.
I did careful studies of these examples of “strange objects”, and I discovered that the various 
theoretical approaches I know about (semiotics, psychoanalysis, discourse theories, poststruc-
turalism, hermeneutics, etc.) did not help me understand the most fundamental aspect of all of 
them: which is to say, the way they transcend the binary oppositions between organic and inor-
ganic, the natural and the artificial, human and nonhuman. Indeed, all the abovementioned ap-
proaches seemed to me to be too abstract, too textual. Actually, I was looking for an approach
that would transgress and go beyond the cultural and social determinism of a constructivist view 
and be more materialist, more ontological; that would allow me to understand this transforma-
tion of organic into inorganic; human into nonhuman. In a word, the analysis of these phenom-
ena was a challenge. While we are witnessing the appearance of real subjects which do not fit 
our familiar topoi, the human sciences do not have the theoretical instruments to describe them 
and cannot conceptualise them fast enough.
More and more, the humanities are extending their debates about identity, alterity and exclusion 
to encompass nonhuman entities: animals, plants and things. The other is understood not only as 
something of a different race, gender, class, sexual or religious orientation, but also someone or 
something of a different species and organic status (e.g., something inorganic). Studying various 
figurations of subjectivity, we may notice that the conventional criteria based on the cultural and 
social understanding of the subject and the dualist, hierarchical thinking in terms of the organic/
inorganic and human/nonhuman28 have become insufficient, while the popular vision of construc-
tivism, which conceives of race, gender and other aspects of identity as products of culture, limits 
the scope of humanistic research. For example, environmental historian Donald Worster has in-
dicated that the “unexamined cultural determinism which underlies mainstream historiography is 
just as problematic” as any other type of determinism.29 Ted Steinberg, in a less avant-garde mode,
complains that, among such historical categories as race, class, gender, ethnicity and sexuality, 
environment is never mentioned.30 Perhaps we should transgress the cultural determinism of the 
dominant versions of constructivism in a situation in which the interactions between humans and 
nonhumans and the boundaries of species identity have become major problems in the human 
sciences. For example, there are currently many discussions on the “return to things”.31 It does not 
mean, of course, that things have been totally neglected by historians. On the contrary, the study 
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of things is the principal task of the history of material culture. Nonetheless, as I have mentioned 
above, there is a challenge to find a way of moving beyond both the positivistic description of things 
and the semiotic approach to the thing as text, symbol or metaphor. Narrativism and textualism 
“dematerialised” things by comparing the thing to the text and research to reading, and by perceiv-
ing the thing as a message or sign. In an attempt to reverse those negative tendencies, “new ma-
terial studies” point to the agency of things, accentuating the fact that things not only exist but also 
act and have performative potential.32 Of course, the notion of the agency of things does not mean 
that things have intentions, but that they enjoy a particular status in their relations with people.33
For scholars inspired by Marcel Mauss’ idea of the gift, things have a socialising function: they so-
lidify interpersonal relations and they participate in the creation of human identity at the individual 
and collective levels and mark its changes. 
Today’s prevailing approach to nonhumans in terms of their alterity (animals, plants and things 
considered as “others”) is conservative rather than progressive. It remains within the anthropo-
centric humanities; within “enlightened anthropocentrism”. This approach might also be called
paternalism since it presupposes a hegemonic attitude towards nonhuman others. It still im-
plies human mastery and relations of hierarchy but presumes a certain responsibility not only 
towards other humans but also towards nonhuman beings. In this approach, people act on be-
half of nonhumans thereby fulfilling a protective contract.34 Such an approach still promotes a 
colonising discourse in which the nonhuman is treated as the fragile and victimised other in a 
vein similar to that of women, children and the disabled. This approach leads to a radical per-
sonification of animals, plants and things and confirms the perception that treating things and 
animals like people is a way to readdress questions about the human condition. However, even 
within the conventional framework of humanistic research, to pose the problem of a nonhuman 
subject means to challenge the anthropocentric position, and thus make the first step towards 
stopping the anthropogenetic or “anthropological machine” – to use Giorgio Agamben’s term.35
There is no need to emphasise that questions about the human condition deserve special at-
tention given the recent interest in biotechnology, biopower and biopolitics, and the problem of 
the inhumanity of the human that concerns Agamben, for example, still is and always will be of 
special importance. Agamben’s writings prepare a base for posthumanities: however, his project 
continues in the tradition of thinking that rests at the base of anthropocentrism. It was Agamben 
who, in The Open, described and analysed the mechanism of the abovementioned “anthropologi-
cal machine”, which produces and determines the divisions between the human being and the 
animal (many researchers use this concept to dismantle the anthropocentric paradigm). Thus, 
many of Agamben’s concepts are definitely worthy of attention for anyone who would like to work
in the posthumanities: the anthropological machine, creating the nonhuman in a human being, 
the homo sacer, the relation between zoe and bios and the issues of biopower. Reading Agam-
ben I came to the conclusion that perhaps the most important questions are: Do I want to be hu-
man? Do I have a sense of belonging to the human species? Do I feel solidarity with the species?
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Possible trajectories for the theory of history in the future
The proposed topic – “Beyond Anthropocentrism in Historical Studies” – somehow suggests the
possible future orientation of our reflection of the past.36 We need a new metalanguage, which 
would require reconciliation between the human and natural sciences, and perhaps closer re-
lations with cognitivist approaches.37 As Hayden White said once: “every so often we have this 
positivist movement” and indeed we are part of one right now. There is a need to rethink con-
structivism as a dominant tendency (going beyond “cultural determinism”) and to take a closer 
look at so-called new materialism, new empiricism or flat ontology.38 We need to become more 
empirical, focus on building theory from the bottom–up and avoid thinking of theory as a “box 
of tools” that uses research material and data in an instrumentalist way to justify itself. Such a 
bottom–up approach to theory has been recently called “théorie concrète” by Patrick Joyce. At 
issue here is not a theoretical extension over data but the capacity of data to extend our theo-
retical imagination. Joyce claims that the “science studies” agenda is the best one to challenge
the “theory from above” approach since it advocates research-oriented studies and thinking in
terms of science-as-practice.39 “Concrete theory” could help meet some of the basic problems 
of the contemporary human and social sciences, such as the distinction between nature and 
culture (or the natural and the social), the human and the nonhuman, material and immaterial
and organic and inorganic.
To summarise: we proceed with a bottom–up approach; certain phenomena that we study chal-
lenge dominant ways of thinking and available methodologies; thus, based on our findings, we 
propose new concepts. Indeed, the problem of concept-formation, meaning to invent concepts 
that are in keeping with the empirical challenges and problems of our time, is absolutely crucial 
at present. Another possibility – as I mentioned before – would be the rehabilitation and/or re-
invention of those “gothic concepts”40 that was forbidden for many years and together with such 
banned terms as essence, structure and strong subject should be rehabilitated for strategic pur-
poses. Certainly, there is no return, for example, to structuralism after the lessons we learned
from deconstruction, textualism and poststructuralism, but I think we might use a strategy of 
rehabilitation and get rid of the pejorative usage of these terms, so that they are lifted from their 
historical settings and are pushed in directions that are relevant to today’s problems.41
I would propose to conceive posthumanities research as a kind of theoretical frame for identi-
fying “the disobedient research object”, meaning an object resistant to our present knowledge, 
and the possibility of conceptualising it. This might be the goal of our project of nonanthropo-
centric history.
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NOTES
1 This might be only a working name since this term is too paradoxical to be fully accurate. To some
scholars it may seem as an absurd attack the concept of the humanities as a discipline.
2 See Neil Badmington (ed.), Posthumanism, Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave, 2000; Andy Miah, “A
Critical History of Posthumanism”, in Bert Gordijn and Ruth Chadwick (eds), Medical Enhancement and 
Posthumanity, Dordrecht: Springer, 2007; Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2010.
3 There are important differences between approaches to posthumanism that come from, for example, 
technoscience (scholars like Donna Haraway or Bruno Latour), philosophy and cultural studies (Giorgio 
Agamben, Rosi Braidotti, Ernesto Esposito, Cary Wolfe), eco-philosophy or from bioart (SymbioticA).
For example, SymboticA, The Centre of Excellence in Biological Arts at the University of Western Aus-
tralia, “is an artistic laboratory dedicated to the research, learning and critique of life sciences. Sym-
bioticA is the first research laboratory of its kind, in that it enables artists and researchers to engage
in wet biology practices in a biological science department” (www.symbiotica.uwa.edu.au, accessed
21 February 2010). See Monika Bakke, “Zoe-Philic Desires: Wet Media Art and Beyond”, Parallax 14:3
(2008): 21–34.
4 The following books have been published in this series to date, all by the University of Minnesota Press:
Michel Serres, The Parasite (2007), Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (2007), David Willis, Dorsality:
Thinking Back through Technology and Politics (2008), Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy
(2008); Nicole Shukin, Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times (2009), John Protevi, Political 
Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (2009).
5 Cary Wolfe, Introduction to “Posthumanities” series. See www.carywolfe.com/post_about.html, ac-
cessed 21 February 2010.
6 The same idea has been expressed by Gabrielle M. Spiegel during her presidential address to the Amer-
ican Historical Association. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “The Task of the Historian”, American Historical Review
114:1 (2009): 1–15.
7 Cf. Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002.
8 This inadequacy has been indicated, for example, by scholars working on environmental history.
9 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses”, Critical Inquiry 35:2 (2009): 197–222 (198).
10 Ibid., 213.
11 Ibid., 222.
12 Ibid., 199 and also 212, where Chakrabarty says: “The problematic of globalization allows us to read cli-
mate change only as a crisis of capitalist management. While there is no denying that climate change
has profoundly to do with the history of capital, a critique that is only a critique of capital is not suffi-
cient for addressing questions relating to human history once the crisis of climate change has been
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